

Climate Update Report

Quarter 2, 2026 – April – June

A quarterly synthesis of the major events, science, policy and finance shaping the global response to climate change, with sources for further reading throughout.



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Editorial Summary

“Amid geopolitical upheaval, countries in Santa Marta really have shown a new model for cooperation on the energy transition – one that’s putting fossil fuel roadmaps at the centre and focusing on getting down to brass tacks of how to accelerate the shift, and on how to do it together.

– Katrine Petersen of E3G, on the outcome of the Santa Marta Conference – April 30, 2026

The second quarter of 2026 added three more months near the top of the temperature record. April ranked 4th-warmest at 1.12°C above the 20th-century average, while May and June each came 2nd at 1.07°C and 1.09°C, behind only 2024. June set an all-time high for ocean surface temperature in any June, and the Arctic recorded its warmest June. The WMO's decadal update projects annual temperatures of 1.3-1.9°C above pre-industrial levels through 2030 and chances that the 5-year average exceeds 1.5°C at 75%. NOAA declared El Niño conditions in early June. The June heat dome over Europe was the most severe June heatwave in the continental record and virtually impossible half a century ago. Around 45% of the 850 cities analyzed broke or neared all-time heat-stress records, and the WHO counted more than 1,300 excess deaths from 21 June, roughly 1,000 of them in France.

Climate TRACE put global emissions for April at 4.9 billion tons, 0.1% below a year earlier, holding the annual total near 60 billion tons for a fifth consecutive year while atmospheric CO₂ passed 431 ppm. Renewable deployment is absorbing new demand from industry, transport and data centers rather than displacing existing fossil generation, and the remaining budget for 1.5°C is effectively spent. The military campaign conducted by the United States and Israel against Iran continued to transmit through energy, water and food markets. Brent fell more than \$40 a barrel from its early-April peak to around \$81 by mid-June as an interim deal took shape, and Hormuz flows recovered from a May low of 9.6 million barrels a day to about 12 million, though OECD stocks sit at their lowest since 1990. Strikes and threats against desalination plants put water supply under direct military pressure in a region where several states draw close to 90% of their drinking water from the sea. Urea prices doubled between January and May, and the FAO and WFP identified 13 hunger hotspots for June to November.

The first international conference dedicated to transitioning away from fossil fuels met in Santa Marta, Colombia from 24 to 29 April, convening 57 countries representing about a third of the world economy outside the UNFCCC consensus system. It produced three workstreams and a new science panel, and no binding commitments. At Bonn from 8 to 18 June the mitigation work program failed again and was deferred to COP31 in Antalya, along with the Global Goal on Adaptation and the 59 Belém indicators. The Turkish presidency used the session to launch a non-negotiated Action Agenda headed by a goal to raise electricity from just over 20% of final energy demand to 35% by 2035.

IRENA confirmed 692 GW of new renewable capacity in 2025, taking the global total to 5,149 GW and renewables to 49.4% of installed capacity. In April wind and solar generated more electricity worldwide than gas for the first time in any full month, 531 TWh against 477. The IEA expects record energy investment of \$3.4 trillion this year, \$2.2 trillion of it clean against \$1.2 trillion for oil, gas and coal. Policy moved in opposite directions. China issued a five-year plan for the power system on 25 June naming wind and solar the mainstay of generation, Britain wrote an 87% cut for 2038 to 2042 into law on 24 June, and Japan's emissions trading system became mandatory on 1 April, while the United States proposed on 29 May to rescind its corporate climate disclosure rules in full. Developed countries mobilized a record \$136.7 billion in climate finance in 2024, though bilateral public flows fell, and adaptation's share dropped to a quarter. Two billion people still cook without clean fuel. Capital and technology arrive faster than the institutions meant to direct them, and the second half of the year will test whether Antalya can convert any of it into binding commitment.

Key Events

- First Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels — Santa Marta, Colombia. 24-29 April 57 countries; co-hosted by Colombia & The Netherlands
- Bonn Climate Conference UNFCCC SB64 — Bonn, Germany. 8-18 June. Mitigation work program deferred to COP31 (Antalya, Türkiye, November).
- London Climate Action Week — London, UK. 20-28 June

Key Reports

- Tracking SDG7 (IEA, IRENA, UN, WBG, WHO) — [The Energy Progress Report 2026](#), June
- FAO-WMO — [Extreme Heat and Agriculture](#), April
- IEA — [World Energy Investment 2026](#), May
- IEA — [Global Hydrogen Review 2026](#), June
- IEA — [Breakthrough Agenda Report 2026](#), June
- WMO, UK Met Office — [Global Annual to Decadal Climate Update 2026-2035](#), May

Report Highlights

Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report 2026

- Global electricity access has stalled at 92%, leaving 655 million people without power in 2024 — 563 million of them in Sub-Saharan Africa, the only region where the rural access deficit is widening; the pace of electrification must more than triple to reach universal access by 2030
- Two billion people still lack clean cooking access, with 1.8 billion projected to remain without it in 2030 absent course correction — Sub-Saharan Africa's deficit may reach 1 billion by 2027
- Renewables reached 18% of total final energy consumption and a record 544 watts of installed capacity per capita, but stark inequity persists: high-income countries average 1,224 watts per person against just 33.6 in low-income countries
- Finance is fundamentally misaligned with need — international public flows were flat at USD 24.6 billion in 2024, flows to least developed countries fell 11% to USD 3.7 billion, and annual transition investment must rise from USD 2.2 trillion to USD 3–5 trillion by 2030

FAO & WMO — Extreme Heat and Agriculture

- Extreme heat is a powerful risk multiplier across all agricultural subsectors, threatening the livelihoods of 1.23 billion people — agricultural workers are 35 times more likely to die from occupational heat exposure than workers in all other sectors combined, with 470 billion labor hours lost globally in 2021
- Productivity losses are already measurable: maize and wheat yields have declined 7.5% and 6.0% per 1°C of warming, with a further ~10% decline projected per additional degree; under high-emission scenarios nearly half the world's cattle could face dangerous heat by 2100, with annual losses approaching USD 40 billion
- Marine heatwaves are driving repeated mass mortality events and forcing fish stocks to migrate, while unworkable-heat days could reach 250 per year across much of South Asia, tropical Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of the Americas

- Because extreme heat is predictable, early warning systems and anticipatory action offer a key adaptation opportunity — but the report is explicit that adaptation has profound limits, and only ambitious multilateral mitigation can durably protect agrifood systems

IEA — World Energy Investment 2026

- Global energy investment to reach a record USD 3.4 trillion in 2026 (+5%) despite the Middle East conflict — USD 2.2 trillion to clean energy, almost double the USD 1.2 trillion going to oil, gas and coal
- Electricity now attracts nearly 60% of all energy investment (USD 1.6 trillion in supply and infrastructure; USD 2 trillion including end-use electrification), reinforcing the "Age of Electricity" — though renewables spending has dipped year-on-year to ~USD 665 billion on cost declines and policy shifts in China and the US
- The conflict is reshaping capital flows toward energy security: repair bills in the Middle East will run to tens of billions of dollars, coal supply investment hits USD 180 billion (highest since 2012, ~70% in China), and nuclear stages a comeback with 78 GW under construction across 15 countries
- Fuel importers are turning to domestic resources — solar panel imports tripled in the Philippines and hit record highs across 15 African countries in Q1 2026 as households and businesses insulate themselves from fuel shocks


IEA — Global Hydrogen Review 2026

- Global hydrogen demand surpassed 100 Mt in 2025, but low-emissions production reached only ~1 Mt (up 20%) — set to exceed 1% of global supply for the first time in 2026, with China behind nearly three-quarters of new electrolyzer installations
- The Middle East conflict has severely disrupted hydrogen-based product trade — the region accounts for over a quarter of global ammonia trade, ~40% of urea and ~45% of methanol — with the Hormuz closure doubling urea prices between January and May 2026 and raising food security risks
- Demand remains the crucial missing piece: the 2030 project pipeline has shrunk by 10 Mt to 27 Mt, committed production edged up just 3% to 4.3 Mt, and only ~20% of new offtake agreements are backed by firm contractual commitments
- Hydrogen can support long-term energy diversification and security, but is not ready at scale to relieve the current crisis — governments urged to renew 2030 targets and accelerate demand-side policy implementation


IEA — Breakthrough Agenda Report 2026

- International climate collaboration has shifted from setting commitments to delivering them — the report reviews 16 of the nearly 120 Plans to Accelerate Solutions (PASs) created under the COP30 Action Agenda, ahead of the next Global Stocktake in 2028
- The central finding is a recurring outcome-action mismatch: plans articulate transformational outcomes but rely on preparatory activities (studies, dialogues, pledges) insufficient to shift investment or deployment at scale
- Government engagement is the binding constraint — most plans were shaped by international organizations and non-state actors, and stronger government leadership is needed to translate them into policy, demand and finance; trade is flagged as a critical under-addressed lever in steel and fertilizers
- Near-term priorities converge across all six sectors (hydrogen, road transport, steel, cement, buildings, fertilizers) on three levers: firm demand creation, interoperable standards, and scaled-up concessional finance to unlock first commercial projects in emerging markets

Carbon Emissions Data



[Emissions](#) for 2026 started higher in January and dipped below the 2025 peak for February, hitting 5.1 billion tons for March 2026, and 4.9 billion for April, for a **0.1% decrease** from the same period in 2025. Global Methane emissions, however, were 0.1% higher in April.



By sector, power still dominates the picture and the cyclical, seasonal nature of GHG emissions can be clearly seen. It also shows that at ~60 billion tons a year, emissions have stayed basically flat for five years, even as the economy grew, incomes rose, and power and data center demand surged. The massive rollout of renewables, energy efficiency, and decarbonization is covering new growth rather than cutting existing emissions, leaving the emissions curve flat when it needs to be bending down. The

remaining carbon budget to meet the Paris Agreement temperature target of 1.5°C is effectively exhausted. [Atmospheric CO₂](#) continues to climb, with the latest readings above **431 ppm**.

Global Temperature Records

2024 remains the warmest year on record, and the second quarter kept 2026 close behind it. [April](#) was the 4th-warmest April on record at 1.12°C above the 20th-century average, trailing 2024, 2025 and 2020. [May](#) was the second-warmest May at 1.07°C and [June](#) the second-warmest June at 1.09°C, in both cases behind only 2024, adding two further months to the top three table below. Global ocean surface temperature in June was the highest recorded for any June, and the Arctic recorded its warmest June on record. The January to June period ranked third highest on record, and NOAA declared El Niño conditions in early June, expected to strengthen through the second half of the year.

Hottest on Record	1st		2nd		3rd	
January	2025	+1.31°C	2024	+1.29°C	2020	+1.17°C
February	2024	+1.40°C	2016	+1.31°C	2025	+1.22°C
March	2025	+1.32°C	2026	+1.31°C	2024	+1.31°C
April	2024	+1.26°C	2025	+1.20°C	2020	+1.13°C
May	2024	+1.15°C	2026	+1.07°C	2025	+1.06°C
June	2024	+1.17°C	2026	+1.09°C	2023	+1.06°C
July	2024	+1.18°C	2023	+1.16°C	2025	+0.96°C
August	2024	+1.24°C	2023	+1.24°C	2025	+1.06°C
September	2023	+1.40°C	2024	+1.22°C	2025	+1.15°C
October	2023	+1.37°C	2024	+1.34°C	2025	+1.23°C
November	2023	+1.43°C	2024	+1.33°C	2025	+1.18°C
December	2023	+1.39°C	2024	+1.30°C	2019	+1.13°C

April '26: +1.12°C (#4) | May '26: +1.07°C (#2) | June '26: +1.09°C (#2)

NOAA's Global Annual Temperature Outlook rates it very likely that 2026 will finish among the five warmest years on record; following the June data, NCEI's statistical analysis put the chance of a top-four finish at about 95%, before accounting for the El Niño now developing.

Climate Security Nexus

Water Security

- Q2 marked the moment water infrastructure moved from collateral concern to declared target in the Gulf conflict. Following the March strikes on desalination facilities in Iran, Bahrain and Kuwait, [CSIS analysis](#) published earlier in March warned that deliberate targeting of the Gulf's desalination systems would violate Article 54(2) of the Geneva Conventions' Additional Protocol and could constitute a war crime—yet Iranian threats against named facilities, including Ras al-Khair, Shuaiba and Taweelah, persisted through the quarter. The stakes are existential for the region: desalination supplies roughly [90% of drinking water](#) in Kuwait and Bahrain, 86% in Oman, and nearly 99% in Qatar, while GCC states account for about 60% of global desalination capacity. [Circle of Blue](#) estimates 72 million residents across the region are vulnerable to threats against these plants. In June, days before the interim ceasefire, US strikes reportedly hit reservoirs on [Sirik, Jask and Qeshm Island](#), cutting supply to some 20,000 residents. The quarter's core lesson: in the world's most water-stressed region, water security and national security have fully converged, and GCC conceptions of both will likely stand transformed when the guns fall silent.

Energy Security

- The energy shock crested and partially receded in Q2. Brent collapsed more than \$40 per barrel from its early-April peak to around \$81 by mid-June on speculation of a US–Iran deal, and the IEA's June [Oil Market Report](#) confirmed an interim peace deal, with Hormuz flows recovering from a May low of 9.6 mb/d to around 12 mb/d—though global supply is still expected to fall 3.9 mb/d in 2026, and OECD government stocks sit at their lowest level since 1990. The structural response is already visible in capital flows: the IEA's [World Energy Investment 2026](#) projects record investment of \$3.4 trillion this year, with clean energy at \$2.2 trillion, nearly double fossil fuels, and fuel importers turning sharply to domestic resources—solar panel imports tripled in the Philippines and hit record highs across 15 African countries in Q1 2026. Symbolically, [Ember reported](#) that April 2026 was the first month in which wind and solar generated more electricity than gas globally. The Energy Institute's [Statistical Review](#) quantified the exposure the crisis laid bare: India, China and Europe import 86%, 73% and 75% of their oil respectively. The transition is increasingly framed not as climate policy but as insurance against single-point geopolitical disruption.

Food Security

- The conflict's most dangerous transmission channel to the world's poorest ran through fertilizer. The IEA's [Global Hydrogen Review](#) reported that urea prices doubled between January and May 2026 as the Hormuz closure choked a corridor carrying up to 30% of internationally traded fertilizers, with acute exposure in import-dependent economies from Morocco to Brazil and South Asia. Against this backdrop, the FAO–WFP [Hunger Hotspots](#) outlook identified 13 hotspots for June–November, with famine risk persisting in Sudan, South Sudan, the Gaza Strip, and Somalia—just as humanitarian food funding has fallen an estimated 59% since 2022. Climate is a compounding accelerant on both horizons: the FAO–WMO [Extreme Heat and Agriculture](#) report documented mounting heat-driven losses across crops, livestock and fisheries threatening 1.23 billion livelihoods, while the WMO's [El Niño Update](#) put the probability of El Niño conditions at 80% for June–August, raising drought and flood risks across already fragile regions in the second half of 2026. Conflict remains the primary driver of acute hunger—but the fertilizer-price, heat and ENSO signals point to a climate-widened crisis into 2027.

Climate Diplomacy

- The first [Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels](#) met in Santa Marta, Colombia from 24 to 29 April, co-hosted by Colombia and the Netherlands, with 57 countries representing roughly a third of the world economy. It was deliberately convened outside the UNFCCC consensus framework and run largely in closed, non-attribution sessions. Participants agreed three workstreams covering national and regional phase-out roadmaps, subsidy and fiscal reform, and trade, published a synthesis of twelve action insights, and launched a new science panel emerging from a 400-strong academic pre-conference to complement the IPCC. Tuvalu and Ireland will co-host the second conference in 2027, and the outcome feeds the COP30 Presidency's informal fossil-fuel roadmap and COP31. Nothing agreed is binding, which is both the reason agreement was possible and the limit of what it delivers.
- The Bonn Climate Change Conference ran from [8 to 18 June](#) and closed with the mitigation work program, the only standing agenda item on cutting emissions, unresolved and deferred to COP31. The Global Goal on Adaptation and the finalization of the 59 Belém adaptation indicators proved to be among the most contentious files, and the long-standing division between developed and developing parties on finance reopened. Negotiators did advance the Belém Action Mechanism onto the COP31 agenda, though its funding and governance remain

undefined, and the first UNFCCC dialogue on climate change and trade was held. Executive Secretary Simon Stiell opened the session by calling for simpler access to climate finance and better coordination among providers, framing the year as one of implementation rather than negotiation.

- On 9 June in Bonn, COP31 President-Designate Murat Kurum launched the [COP31 Action Agenda](#), setting out ten priority themes headed by a global electrification goal to raise electricity from just over 20% of final energy demand today to 35% by 2035. Accompanying targets would halve the growth in global waste by 2035 and cut building sector energy intensity by at least 25% over the same period, with the IEA commissioned to map pathways and quantify benefits. Australia's Chris Bowen, who holds the presidency of negotiations under the split arrangement with Türkiye, said he would push for a strong outcome on switching from fossil fuels to electricity in transport, industry and buildings. The agenda is non-negotiated, which allows it to be specific where the formal texts are not, and leaves it without any mechanism of accountability.

Climate Resilience

- World Weather Attribution concluded on [26 June](#) that the heat dome over Europe in the second half of the month was the most severe June heatwave in the continental record, "virtually impossible" half a century ago and with climate change "unequivocally to blame." Of some 850 European cities analyzed, around 45% broke or were on course to break all-time heat-stress records. The World Health Organization counted more than 1,300 excess deaths from 21 June, roughly 1,000 of them in France from 24 June alone. Copernicus logged the month as western Europe's hottest June on record. The event followed an unusually early and intense heatwave over the same region between 21 and 30 May, in which Mora in Portugal reached 40.3°C, and the pairing matters more than either episode on its own, since it extends the heat season at both ends into periods for which health systems and labor rules are not calibrated.
- UNICEF's [Children's Climate Risk Report 2026](#), launched on 16 June, finds that all 2.4 billion children worldwide are now exposed to at least one major climate hazard and that 1.1 billion, close to half, face three or more overlapping hazards, with more than four million exposed to as many as six. Heatwaves reach 1.5 billion children, extreme heat 1.2 billion, tropical storms 662 million, wildfires 206 million and sand and dust storms 123 million. Roughly one billion are exposed to malaria transmission risk. The significance lies in the overlap rather than the headline totals, since it is compounding hazards arriving in sequence that exhaust household coping capacity and public health systems, and single-hazard planning does not capture that.
- NOAA ranked [June 2026](#) the second-warmest June on record globally at 1.09°C above the twentieth-century average, with global ocean surface temperature the highest ever measured for the month and the Arctic recording its warmest June. The January to June period ranked third highest on record. NOAA declared El Niño conditions in early June, with strengthening expected through the second half of the year. Ocean heat is the more consequential of these signals for the water and coastal sectors, since it governs marine heatwave frequency, sea-level contribution through thermal expansion, and the moisture available to storm systems, and it responds far more slowly than surface air temperature to any subsequent cooling.

Decarbonization

- On 29 May 2026 the [US Securities and Exchange Commission](#) proposed to rescind in their entirety the climate-related disclosure rules adopted in March 2024, which would have required public companies to report greenhouse gas emissions and disclose how climate-related risks such as rising sea levels, drought and extreme weather affect their financial position. The rules

never took effect, having stalled amid legal challenges, and the Commission had already [told the Eighth Circuit on 7 May](#) that it would not renew its defense of them. Chairman Paul Atkins argued that disclosure obligations should be "guided by materiality as the North Star," and the proposal estimates annualized savings from repeal at roughly \$4.9 billion a year over ten years. Comments close on 3 August, and a final vote is expected later in 2026. The framing recasts corporate climate disclosure as a matter for environmental regulators rather than securities oversight, narrowing a standardized channel through which investors had been expected to receive information on the material financial implications of climate change. The practical effect is narrower than the politics suggests, since California's SB 253 sets its first emissions reporting deadline for 10 August 2026 and the EU's Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive and the ISSB standards continue to bind internationally exposed firms.

- Parliament passed the [Seventh Carbon Budget into law on 24 June](#), binding the United Kingdom to cut emissions by roughly 87% from 1990 levels across the 2038 to 2042 period, in line with Climate Change Committee advice and making it the deepest legally binding long-term target adopted by any major economy. The Committee's annual progress report to Parliament, published the same day, found the government's electrification plan short on ambition and warned that heat pump and electric van uptake are both running behind the pace the budget assumes. The sequencing is the point. The target is now statutory, while the delivery mechanisms that would meet it are not, and the Committee has said the rate of reduction must accelerate materially to keep the 2030 nationally determined contribution within reach.
- On 25 June the National Development and Reform Commission and the National Energy Administration issued the [15th Five-Year Plan for Building a New Energy System](#), covering 2026 to 2030. The plan names wind and solar the "mainstay" of the power mix, targets non-fossil sources at 50% of power generation by 2030 and sets a specific goal of 30% for wind and solar, up from roughly 22% today. It is accompanied by an intensive campaign running from 2026 to 2028 on energy conservation and carbon reduction across nine heavy industries. The document is notably more ambitious on clean build-out than the headline 15th Five-Year Plan adopted by the National People's Congress in March was on carbon intensity, continuing a pattern in which Chinese deployment targets outrun Chinese emissions targets.
- Carbon pricing widened at the start of the quarter. Japan's [GX-ETS became mandatory on 1 April](#), requiring roughly 300 to 400 firms with annual emissions above 100,000 tons of CO₂ to participate in a baseline-and-credit system covering around 60% of national emissions. It is the first compliance carbon market in a major Asian economy outside China and Korea, and its baseline-and-credit design, rather than a hard cap, reflects the same balance between industrial competitiveness and abatement that runs through the EU's carbon border adjustment mechanism and China's new energy plan.

Renewable Energy

- Global renewable power capacity reached a record [5,149 GW](#) at the end of 2025, with 692 GW added during the year, the largest annual increase ever recorded. Renewables accounted for 85.6% of all new power capacity and now represent 49.4% of total global installed electricity capacity, up from 46.3% the previous year, according to IRENA's [Renewable Capacity Statistics 2026](#), published 1 April 2026. Solar led the expansion with 511 GW added, a 27.2% increase accounting for roughly three-quarters of all renewable additions and bringing cumulative global solar capacity to 2,392 GW. Wind additions reached 159 GW, up 14.0%, with solar and wind together making up 96.8% of net renewable additions.
- Wind and solar generated more electricity than gas worldwide for the first time in any full month in April 2026, [Ember reported on 21 May](#). The two sources produced a record 531 TWh against 477 TWh from gas, taking 22% of global generation against gas at 20%. In April 2021 gas

generated an almost identical 476 TWh, but wind and solar managed only 245 TWh. Output rose an estimated 13% year on year, led by the United Kingdom at 35%, Chile at 24%, Australia at 17%, China at 14% and the European Union at 13%. Ember attributes the milestone to sustained capacity growth rather than the energy crisis, and found no evidence of a broad switch back to coal despite the disruption to gas markets.

- Asia contributed 74.2% of all new renewable capacity in 2025, adding 513.3 GW for growth of 21.6%, while Africa posted record growth of 15.9%, or 11.3 GW, led by Ethiopia, South Africa and Egypt. On the generation side, Ember's [Global Electricity Review 2026](#), published in April, found that solar met three-quarters of the net rise in global electricity demand in 2025, with solar generation up 30% to 2,778 TWh and now equivalent to the total electricity demand of the European Union. Wind and solar together covered 99% of demand growth, holding total fossil generation roughly flat. Solar overtook wind globally for the first time in 2025, and China accounted for more than half the global increase in both solar capacity and solar generation, lifting the combined solar and wind share of its own generation mix to 22%, above the OECD average of 20%.
- The Middle East recorded its strongest annual growth on record, with renewable capacity expanding 28.9%, or 12.7 GW, led by **Saudi Arabia**. According to [IRENA data](#), Saudi installed capacity rose 86.8% year on year to 12,332 MW, the largest absolute addition in the region and driven almost entirely by utility-scale solar PV. The kingdom entered the global top ten of renewable energy investors for the first time, committing approximately \$34 billion to clean power projects, a nearly 70% increase on the previous year. The **UAE** expanded capacity 15.4% to 7,907 MW. **Oman** recorded the fastest percentage growth in the GCC, surging 138.5% to 1,722 MW following the commissioning of the Manah I and II solar projects, advancing the Oman Vision 2040 target of nearly 40% of electricity from renewables by 2040. IRENA Director-General Francesco La Camera noted that countries which invested in the transition are weathering the Middle East crisis with less economic damage, citing improved energy security, resilience and competitiveness.

Carbon Removal Technology

- Microsoft told carbon removal suppliers in the week of 10 April that it was pausing new purchases, a decision [first reported by Heatmap](#) and Bloomberg. On 14 April its chief sustainability officer, Melanie Nakagawa, told S&P Global Platts that the program had [not ended and that the pace had been adjusted](#) as part of a "disciplined approach," with no change in ambition and no timeline for resumption. Existing [contracts](#) stand, including a 626,000-ton biomass removal offtake signed with Svante and the Meadow Lake Tribal Council on 6 April.
- The exposure is concentration rather than volume. CDR.fyi puts Microsoft at roughly 90% of all carbon removal purchases worldwide in 2025 and 79% to 90% of durable removal procurement historically, with more than 36.4 million tons contracted. The second-largest buyer, the Striped Frontier coalition, has contracted about 1.8 million tons over its lifetime. Public procurement is the nearest substitute, with [\\$116 million](#) for removal research and federal purchasing in the 2026 US spending law and Canada's first national CDR program, though neither approaches Microsoft's scale.
- Occidental disclosed a delay to the world's largest direct air capture facility on its [first-quarter earnings call on 6 May](#). Phase 1 commissioning at Stratos in Ector County, Texas was held up by a non-process component after the air contactors and central processing facility performed as designed. Phase 2 construction is complete, the 2026 capital range of \$5.5 billion to \$5.9 billion was unchanged, and no revised start date was given. The plant is designed for 500,000 tons a year, more than all operating DAC capacity combined.

- European cross-border storage continued adding transport capacity. Northern Lights, the Equinor, Shell and TotalEnergies venture, named its [third dedicated CO₂ carrier on 9 April](#), with Danish and Dutch volumes from Ørsted and Yara due to join Norwegian cement and waste-to-energy cargoes during 2026. A second shuttle, Carbon Destroyer 1, is completing commissioning for INEOS Energy's Greensand site in the Danish North Sea. Phase 2 will raise Northern Lights injection capacity from 1.5 to at least 5 million tons a year.

Green Hydrogen

- The pipeline is shrinking faster than the projects are arriving. The IEA's [Global Hydrogen Review 2026](#), published on 18 June, records the first outright contraction in the sector's forward book. Announced production for 2030 fell by 10 Mt to 27 Mt as projects were delayed, paused or cancelled, while committed production crept up just 3% to 4.3 Mt. Around [22 Mt of that potential](#) will lose any chance of operating by 2030 unless investment decisions land by early 2027, two-thirds of it in Europe, North America and Latin America. The blunter number is that 99% of the hydrogen the world produces today is still not low-emissions.
- Capital is finally moving, and most of it is Chinese. Spending on low-emissions hydrogen projects reached [nearly \\$7 billion in 2025](#), close to double the 2024 figure, and the IEA expects roughly \$10 billion in 2026 with electrolysis taking about 70% of it. Electrolysis has now overtaken CCUS-based hydrogen on investment, a reversal of the industry's earlier assumption that blue would lead. China accounts for more than 60% of committed electrolysis capacity by 2026 and installed close to three-quarters of new electrolyzers last year, even as its manufacturing base enters consolidation on chronic overcapacity. Of 66 national hydrogen strategies, [only China and the Netherlands](#) are on track for their 2030 targets, and Chile and the Netherlands have both revised targets downward.
- The Gulf crisis handed hydrogen an argument it had been missing. The IEA framed this year's review around energy security, noting that the Middle East conflict has disrupted supplies of hydrogen derivatives including ammonia, urea and methanol, exposing how thin those supply chains are. On cost, the agency now expects the cheapest green hydrogen by 2030 in northern China at [below \\$2 per kilogram](#), with the Middle East, India and Chile clustered just above \$3 and parts of Europe near \$3.50. Blue hydrogen could in theory beat all of them at just above \$1, but no operating project achieves anything close while also hitting 95% capture rates and minimal methane leakage.

Biodiversity

- Donors renewed the Global Environment Facility. The [71st GEF Council closed in Samarkand on 3 June](#) having endorsed the programming directions for a 9th replenishment at \$3.9 billion covering July 2026 to June 2030, following initial pledges announced on 9 April. The GEF, LDCF/SCCF and GBFF councils together approved \$232.5 million across 24 projects in 22 countries. In a year where the United States has withdrawn from a long list of multilateral bodies, a replenishment of funding—that neither grew nor collapsed—counts as a result.
- The first scorecard on the world's biodiversity targets is not flattering. On 2 June the CBD Secretariat released the [draft global report on collective progress](#) under the Kunming-Montreal framework, opening it for peer review until 29 June. Drawing on 129 national reports, 3,693 national targets and 89 national strategies, the draft finds that the framework has driven unprecedented engagement, but that [only Target 8](#), on minimizing climate impacts on biodiversity, is on track, and even that is still not fast enough. Target 19, the pledge to mobilize \$200 billion a year for nature by 2030, is among the laggards. The revised text goes to COP17 in Yerevan from 19 to 30 October.

- Nature edged onto the climate agenda rather than the other way around. Presenting the COP31 [Action Agenda in Bonn on 9 June](#), Türkiye's president-designate Murat Kurum listed cross-sector work to build synergies between climate change, biodiversity and land degradation among the presidency's ten priority themes. That places the Rio conventions inside a COP work program rather than alongside it, which is what campaigners have asked for since Cali. Whether a non-negotiated action agenda can deliver it is another question.

Climate Finance


- Rich countries hit a record just as the money starts to run out. Developed countries provided and mobilized [\\$136.7 billion in climate finance in 2024](#), the OECD reported on 21 May, clearing the \$100 billion pledge for a third consecutive year and rising 3% on 2023. The composition is more revealing than the headline. Mobilized private finance jumped 33% to \$30.5 billion, its fastest growth since 2016, driven largely by multilateral development banks. Bilateral public flows went the other way, falling to \$43.9 billion from \$50.2 billion. Adaptation, the priority developing countries press hardest at every negotiation, slipped to a quarter of the total from a third in 2022. The record is also probably the high-water mark, since the 2025 figures will capture a year in which Washington halted its contributions to international climate funds, and the \$300 billion goal agreed at Baku runs to 2035.
- The loss and damage fund learned how to move money, without yet moving any. The Fund for responding to Loss and Damage held its [eighth Board meeting in Livingstone, Zambia from 22 to 24 April](#), its first since opening the pilot funding window, and used it to settle plumbing rather than make awards. The Board approved risk management modalities allowing money to flow as direct budget support through national treasuries instead of only through international intermediaries, a genuine departure for a multilateral climate fund. By 3 April the secretariat had logged [ten requests worth \\$165.9 million](#) from Bangladesh, Mozambique, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Somalia, Haiti, Jamaica, India, Nigeria and Yemen, and expected as many as a hundred before the window [closed on 15 June](#). Against that pipeline the fund has \$250 million to allocate. First approvals were pushed to the ninth Board in July.
- Sustainable debt is now a mature market rather than a growing one. Moody's reported in May that global issuance of labeled sustainable bonds reached [\\$241 billion in the first quarter of 2026](#), up 18% on the previous quarter but down 17% year on year, with European issuers supplying more than half the volume. Green bonds took \$152 billion of the total and social bonds doubled to \$48 billion, while sustainability-linked instruments continued their retreat as issuers moved toward use-of-proceeds structures that are harder to accuse of greenwashing. Moody's left its full-year forecast unchanged at roughly \$900 billion, which would make 2026 the second flat year running.

Climate Charts & Data Visualizations

NOAA – [Global Climate Report](#)


Global Land and Ocean Average Temperature Departures

April




Global Land and Ocean Average Temperature Departures

May



Global Land and Ocean Average Temperature Departures

June



Tracking SDG7 (IEA, IRENA, UN, WBG, WHO) — [The Energy Progress Report 2026](#)
Figure ES.1 • Primary indicators of global progress toward the SDG 7 targets

INDICATOR		2015	2024
7.1.1 Proportion of population with access to electricity		958 million people without access to electricity	655 million people without access to electricity (2024)
7.1.2 Proportion of population with primary reliance on clean fuels and technology for cooking		2.7 billion people without access to clean cooking	2.0 billion people without access to clean cooking (2024)
7.2.1 Renewable energy share in total final energy consumption		15.6% share of total final energy consumption from renewables	18.0% share of total final energy consumption from renewables (2023)
7.3.1 Energy intensity measured as a ratio of primary energy and GDP		4.22 MJ/USD primary energy intensity	3.76 MJ/USD primary energy intensity (2023)
7.a.1 International financial flows to developing countries in support of clean energy research and development and renewable energy production, including in hybrid systems		14.3 USD billion international financial flows to developing countries in support of clean energy	24.6 USD billion international financial flows to developing countries in support of clean energy (2024)
7.b.1 Installed renewable energy-generating capacity in developing and developed countries		248 watts per capita installed renewables capacity	544 watts per capita installed renewables capacity (2024)


Oman >

[Go to Country Report](#)


ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY
(% of population)



ACCESS TO CLEAN COOKING
(% of population)



RENEWABLE ENERGY
(% of Total Final Energy Consumption)

Country Value

6.1

NaN
Global Average

Country Value
143

Country Value
N/A

ENERGY EFFICIENCY
(MJ per 2021 USD PPP)


RENEWABLE CAPACITY PER CAPITA
(Watts per capita)

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL FLOWS
(Constant 2022 USD (million))


China >

[Go to Country Report](#)


ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY
(% of population)



ACCESS TO CLEAN COOKING
(% of population)



RENEWABLE ENERGY
(% of Total Final Energy Consumption)

Country Value

5.4

NaN
Global Average

Country Value
1022

Country Value
71

ENERGY EFFICIENCY
(MJ per 2021 USD PPP)

RENEWABLE CAPACITY PER CAPITA
(Watts per capita)

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL FLOWS
(Constant 2022 USD (million))


United States of America >

[Go to Country Report](#)


ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY
(% of population)



ACCESS TO CLEAN COOKING
(% of population)



RENEWABLE ENERGY
(% of Total Final Energy Consumption)

Country Value

3.8

NaN
Global Average

Country Value
1121


Country Value
N/A

ENERGY EFFICIENCY
(MJ per 2021 USD PPP)


RENEWABLE CAPACITY PER CAPITA
(Watts per capita)

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL FLOWS
(Constant 2022 USD (million))


Viet Nam >

[Go to Country Report](#)


ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY
(% of population)



ACCESS TO CLEAN COOKING
(% of population)



RENEWABLE ENERGY
(% of Total Final Energy Consumption)

Country Value

3.3

NaN
Global Average

Country Value
459

Country Value
240

ENERGY EFFICIENCY
(MJ per 2021 USD PPP)

RENEWABLE CAPACITY PER CAPITA
(Watts per capita)

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL FLOWS
(Constant 2022 USD (million))


United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland >

[Go to Country Report](#)


ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY
(% of population)



ACCESS TO CLEAN COOKING
(% of population)



RENEWABLE ENERGY
(% of Total Final Energy Consumption)

Country Value

1.7

NaN
Global Average

Country Value
811

Country Value
N/A


ENERGY EFFICIENCY
(MJ per 2021 USD PPP)

RENEWABLE CAPACITY PER CAPITA
(Watts per capita)

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL FLOWS
(Constant 2022 USD (million))

Electrification and clean-energy investment decisions of the past reveal the fuel-saving effects on energy security


Avoided fossil fuel imports in 2025 in net energy importing regions, resulting from clean-energy investments of 2015-2024



Over USD 260 billion in fossil fuel import costs were avoided in 2025 thanks to cumulative investments in efficiency and alternative sources of energy in key net energy-importing regions since 2015.

Notes: MER = market exchange rate. Prices used in this analysis are based on IEA (2025), World Energy Outlook 2025. Given that Southeast Asia is a net exporter of coal and natural gas, the value indicates the incremental revenue from these exports.

Despite the Middle East conflict, capital outlays on fuels are expected to rise about 3% in 2026, driven mainly by investment in natural gas projects



Announced investment plans suggest a third consecutive year of lower oil supply spending in 2026. Still, overall fuel investment is set to rise marginally as expenditures in natural gas increase to USD 330 billion and in coal supply increase to the highest level since 2012.

Notes: MER = market exchange rate. 2026e = estimated. capex = capital expenditure. Oil, natural gas and coal include upstream, refining and infrastructure investment. "Low-emissions fuels" comprises modern bioenergy, low-emissions hydrogen, hydrogen-based fuels and carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS).


Global Hydrogen Review Summary Progress

Production

Low-emissions hydrogen

Mtpa


● Renewables ● Fossil fuels with CCUS



Low-emissions hydrogen production from announced projects by 2030


Mtpa

● Renewables ● Fossil fuels with CCUS ● FID



Electrolyser installed capacity


GW



Announced electrolyser projects by 2030


GW

● Early stage ● Feasibility study ● FID



Electrolyser manufacturing capacity


GW/yr



Announced electrolyser manufacturing capacity by 2030


GW/yr

● Rest of announced projects ● FID



Policies


Number of hydrogen strategies



Investment

Electrolyser and CCUS projects

Billion USD






Figure 9: Predictions for 2026-2030 May to September anomalies relative to 1991-2020. Ensemble mean (left column) for temperature (top, °C), sea level pressure (middle, hPa), precipitation (bottom, mm/day), stippled where more than 1/3 of prediction systems disagree on the sign of the anomaly, and probability of above average (right column). As this is an uncalibrated two-category forecast, the probability for below average is one minus the probability shown in the right column.